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Acronyms
• Binary decision diagram (BDD)
• Block Triple Modular Redundancy (BTMR)
• Combinatorial logic (CL)
• Computer Aided Design (CAD)
• Device under test (DUT)
• Distributed triple modular redundancy 
(DTMR)
• Dual interlocked storage cell (DICE)
• Edge-triggered flip-flops (DFFs)
• Equivalence checking (EC)
• Error detection and correction (EDAC)
• Error rate (dE/dt)
• Fault tolerance (FT)
• Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
• Formal verification (FV)
• Global triple modular redundancy (GTMR)
• Hardware description language (HDL)
• Input – output (I/O)
• Linear energy transfer (LET)
• Local triple modular redundancy (LTMR)
• Mitigation Window (MW)
• Mean time to failure (MTTF)
• Operational frequency (fs)
• Power on reset (POR)
• Radiation Effects and Analysis Group 
(REAG)
• Single Error Correct Double Error Detect 
(SECDED)
• Single event functional interrupt (SEFI)
• Single event effects (SEEs)
• Single event latch-up (SEL)
• Single event transient (SET)
• Single event upset (SEU)
• Single event upset cross-section (σSEU)
• Static random access memory (SRAM)
• Static timing analysis (STA)
• Triple modular redundancy (TMR)
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Abstract
• If a system is required to be protected using triple 
modular redundancy (TMR), improper insertion 
can jeopardize the reliability and security of the 
system.  
• Due to the complexity of the verification process 
and the complexity of digital designs, there are 
currently no available techniques that can 
provide complete and reliable confirmation of 
TMR insertion.  
• We propose a method for TMR insertion 
verification that satisfies the process for reliable 
and trusted systems.  
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Overview
• This presentation addresses the challenge of 
confirming that TMR has been inserted without 
corruption of functionality and with correct 
application of the expected TMR topology.  
• The proposed verification method combines the 
usage of existing formal analysis tools with a 
novel search-detect-and-verify tool.
• This presentation does not address the 
strength/performance of the selected TMR.
– The susceptibility of a circuit post-TMR insertion should 
be evaluated using accelerated testing.
– Selection of the appropriate TMR scheme is based on 
the device type, requirements, and design- flush 
frequency. 
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Can you trust that TMR has been 
inserted as expected (correct 
topological scheme) and has not 
broken existing logic during the 
insertion process?
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Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
• Simply stating a system is using 
TMR mitigation – doesn’t provide 
sufficient information.  
• The real question to answer is: 
What kind of TMR is being used?
6
TMR Schemes are differentiated by how the triplication is 
performed and where the voters are placed
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Various TMR Schemes: Different Topologies
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Block diagram of block 
TMR (BTMR): a complex 
function containing 
combinatorial logic (CL) 
and flip-flops (DFFs) is 
triplicated as three 
black boxes; majority 
voters are placed at the 
outputs of the triplet. 
Block diagram of local 
TMR (LTMR): only flip-
flops (DFFs) are 
triplicated and data-
paths stay singular; 
voters are brought into 
the design and placed 
in front of the DFFs. 
Block Diagram of 
distributed TMR (DTMR): 
the entire design is 
triplicated except for the 
global routes (e.g., clocks); 
voters are brought into the 
design and placed after the 
flip-flops (DFFs).  DTMR 
masks and corrects most 
single event upsets (SEUs). 
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How To Insert TMR into A Design:
FPGA User Design Flow
Create 
Configuration
Place and Route
Output of 
synthesis is a 
gate net list that 
represents the 
given HDL 
function.
Functional 
Specification
HDL
Synthesis
HDL: Hardware description language
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TMR can be 
inserted during 
synthesis or post 
synthesis.
If inserted post 
synthesis, the gate 
level netlist is 
replicated, ripped 
apart, and voters + 
feedback are 
inserted.
TMR can be written 
into the HDL.  
Generally not done 
because too 
difficult.
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Concerns during the TMR Insertion 
Process: Trust and Reliability
• Synthesis TMR insertion:
– Did the tool insert the correct type of TMR?
– Did the user correctly select the expected type of TMR?
– Does the tool implement the correct the topology of the 
expected TMR?
– Is the functionality implemented as expected?
• Post-synthesis TMR insertion:
– Is the functionality broken during the netlist replication 
and voter+feedback insertion process?
– Is the functionality implemented as expected?
– Only DTMR (or XTMR) is offered in available tools.
• Who is involved in the tool development process?
• How is the tool development environment 
controlled and verified?
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Current Verification Process of TMR
• When using a tool – the designer usually assumes the 
insertion to be reliable.
• Not good enough:
I received a call from an organization that used synopsis to insert
“TMR.” They stated that the results were compatible to the design
that had no mitigation.
– This is because the version of the tool only had LTMR 
available.
– LTMR should never be used with SRAM-based FPGAs. This 
has been reported.
– Group didn’t take into account nor verify the topology of the 
inserted TMR.
• Other suggestions to TMR verification:
– Simulation,
– Fault injection, and 
– Formal Verification.
10
None of these suggestions will 
suffice! 
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Verification of TMR Insertion
• Verification is two fold:
– Verification that the functionality was not broken during 
the TMR insertion process.
– Verification that the topology of the TMR scheme 
matches the expected methodology.
• Simulation and fault injection:
– Although any type verification helps, simulation and 
fault injection is ineffective as a total proof because of 
its limited exploration of state-space.
– Limited state-space traversal cannot ensure that all 
nodes have been mitigated as expected.
– Reliable verification is compromised. 
11
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Formal Verification (FV):
Created to address the state-space traversal 
challenge.
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Binary Decision Diagram (BDD)
Formal Verification: 
• Synchronous circuits are 
modeled using BDDs.
• Verification of logic is 
performed by searching 
BDDs:
– Find a given logic group, 
and 
– search through to terminal 
nodes while evaluating logic 
function.
• Types of searches are 
mostly event based:
– A is always triggered if B 
occurs.
– A is never triggered if B 
occurs.
– A is triggered exactly n-
cycles after B occurs.
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Challenges of BDD Implementation
• BDD nodes do not represent circuit elements 
(e.g., DFFs or combinatorial logic blocks).
• BDDs are state-based logic representations of the 
circuit under evaluation.
• BDD representation of a design requires 
exponentially more nodes than circuit graphs.
• In most cases, full designs cannot be represented 
in one BDD.
• In order to model a design using BDDs:
– Designs are intelligently partitioned, and
– Groups of redundant logic nodes are collapsed into one 
group.
14
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Collapse of Redundant Logic
15
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Challenges of Formal Verification and 
TMR Verification
• The intention of TMR implementation is to insert 
redundancy.
• However, FV BDD modeling removes redundant 
nodes.
• Hence, FV, as currently implemented, cannot 
prove that:
– redundancy exists for all nodes and 
– that it is inserted correctly.
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Groups have said that they can verify TMR with FV… the 
studies did not verify based on topology and required a 
significant amount of manual manipulation.  Technique 
is not efficient for verification of a full design.
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FV and Equivalence Checking (EC)
• Equivalence checking is a “watered-down” 
version of FV.
• It is used to prove that the synthesized logic 
output matches the designer generated HDL.
• Hence, EC can be used to prove that the insertion 
of TMR has not broken functionality.
• However, once again, it cannot be used to verify 
redundant nodes.  Hence, it will not verify that the 
expected TMR topology has been inserted 
correctly.
• EC tools are readily available.
17
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Proposed TMR Verification 
Methodology
• Functional Verification:
– Use EC.
• Topology Verification:
– Use a circuit graph (model) to verify TMR 
topology with cone-of-logic theory.
– A cone-of-logic is defined by selecting an 
element under analysis (vertex or End 
Point) and performing a backward trace 
towards its base components.  
– The trace starts at the cone-of-logic 
vertex (in this case a voter or another 
DFF) and ends at the vertex’s previous 
stage of flip-flops (DFFs) or a system 
input (cone-of-logic base elements).  
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In this case, the goal is to verify whether the three copies (TMR 
domains) of logic that feed each voter under analysis are equivalent 
and the voters are inserted as expected
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BTMR Topological Verification
• Search for the voter under analysis; i.e., first 
stage vertex.  
– This voter is directly connected to a 
device output. 
– It will be referred to as output-voter.
• Establish the direct cone-of-logic that feeds 
the output-voter. 
– For proper synchronous design, it is 
expected that the first cone-of-logic stage 
consist solely of the triplicated DFFs and 
the output-voter.
• Verify that the cones-of-logic per TMR domain 
are equivalent copies of each other. 
– This step is simply checking that three of 
the same copies of DFFs are directly 
connected to the voter output.
19
First Stage of Algorithm: Voter and Connected DFF 
Evaluation
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BTMR Topological Verification
• For the following iterations, the vertex (End Point) 
for each cone-of-logic is no longer a voter.  
Alternatively, the vertices are DFFs.  
– The Start Points for each cone’s backward 
trace remain DFFs or system inputs. 
– Recursive iterations within the algorithm are 
based on cones-of-logic; 
– Recursive iterations are exhausted when all 
system inputs associated with the designated 
output-voter are reached and verified.
• Perform a backwards trace to the previous stage 
of DFFs (cone-of-logic base components); and 
establish the cone-of-logic vertex (DFF) under 
analysis.
• Search for the two other TMR domain vertex-DFF 
copies and establish their cones-of-logic.
• Verify that the three cones-of-logic are equivalent.
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Second Stage of Algorithm: Internal Circuitry Evaluation
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DTMR Topological Verification
• Identify all system output DFF-
voter pairs.  As a clarification, 
these components are physically 
connected to the DTMR design’s 
output.
• Establish a cone-of-logic for 
each of the system output DFF-
voter pairs.
• Search and identify the TMR 
replicas of the cones-of-logic.
• Compare cone-of-logic replicas 
across TMR domains.  Verify that 
each cone-of-logic is equivalent 
to its copies.
21
First Iteration of Algorithm:
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DTMR Topological Verification
• After performing the first 
iteration, each of the DFF-voter 
pairs that were labeled as cone-
of-logic base elements now 
become cone-of-logic vertices. 
• The recursive procedure 
terminates when all paths have 
been traced back to system 
inputs.
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Second Iteration of Algorithm:
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Conclusion
• The decision to mitigate a design with TMR is associated with a 
system with significantly high expectations of reliability and trust.
• Improper TMR insertion can comprise a mission along with 
security. 
• This presentation describes a novel TMR insertion verification 
process with two primary concerns: 
– proof that TMR insertion leaves functionality intact; and 
– proof that TMR insertion is topologically implemented as 
expected. 
• Computer aided design (CAD) tools exist that can verify original 
(unmitigated) functionality is intact.  It is important to take into 
account that simply proving original functionality is intact does 
not definitively prove that mitigation is inserted correctly. 
• We suggest performing an additional stage of TMR insertion 
verification.  This stage evaluates design topology.
• We refer to the proposed topological evaluation tool as search-
detect-and-verify. 
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